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GENTLY INTO THE GOOD NIGHT: TOWARD A
COMPASSIONATE RESPONSE TO END-STAGE
ILLNESS
by GEORGE P. SMITH, II*
“Finished, it’s finished, nearly finished, it must be nearly finished.”1
—Samuel Beckett

End-of-life decision making by health care providers must respect
individual patient values. Indeed, these values must always be viewed as the
baseline for developing and pursuing patient-centered palliative care for
those with terminal illness. Co-ordinate with this fundamental bioethics
principle is that of beneficence or, in other words, respect for conduct which
benefits the dying patient by alleviating end-stage suffering—be it physical or
existential. Compassion, charity, agape and/or just common sense, should be
a part of setting normative standards and of legislative and judicial responses
to the task of managing death. Aided by the principles of medical futility,
palliative care protocols, greater acceptance of a patient’s right to refuse
treatment, and a spirit of basic humaneness, an ethic of adjusted care that
seeks to secure dignity during the dying process without unreasonable
interference by the state should be validated.
I. TOWARD A STANDARD OF HUMANE CARE
Caring, as a role and obligation for health care providers, may be seen as
a moral obligation rooted in the time-honored principle of beneficence
whose goal is to promote patient well-being.2 Considered as such, “caring
indubitably incorporates empathy.”3 Incorporating caring into the
* Professor of Law, The Catholic University of America. Parts of this essay are drawn from my
article entitled, Refractory Pain, Existential Suffering, and Palliative Care: Releasing an
Unbearable Lightness of Being, 20 CORNELL J. L. & PUB. POL’Y 469 (2011). This article is
dedicated, with respect and admiration, to Joel G. Joffe, Baron Joffe, CBE, member of the
House of Lords in the British Parliament—a strong and eloquent advocate for civil liberties,
human rights, and the enactment of legislation validating compassionate assistance for those
dying of terminal illness.
1. SAMUEL BECKETT, ENDGAME, act 1, sc. 1 (1957).
2. Paul Rousseau, The Fears of Death and The Physician’s Responsibility to Care for the
Dying, 18 AM. J. HOSPICE & PALLIATIVE CARE 224, 224 (2001).
3. Id. The doctor-patient relationship has been termed a “moral relationship”—with care
and empathy being at its core. Consequently, this gives rise to what is seen as a “morality of
care” which imposes upon the physician a responsibility to accept patients as “concrete
individuals” who, in turn, make concrete and immediate claims upon them in their role as
physicians. Anjte du Bois-Pedain, The Duty to Preserve Life and its Limit in English Law, in
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management of the terminally ill is, however, difficult. For the physician to
convey to a patient that, “I could be you,” involves a sympathetic response
which—ideally—may be initiated during the taking of the patient history. 4
During this process, a one-on-one relationship may be commenced which
provides a mechanism for physician assessment and identification of the
emotion the terminally ill patient is experiencing. 5 The physician’s
determination of the reason for the display of emotion and then a response to
the patient’s emotion allows the patient to see that the physician made a
“connection” between the emotion and its root cause. 6 A line of
communication is then opened.
The physician’s establishment of an empathetic response has the direct
effect of assuring patients that they will not be abandoned in their final days.7
For many physicians, however, non-abandonment is instinctively difficult to
honor because of “the fear generated by confrontation of their own mortality
when caring for a dying patient.”8 Because of this situation, patient
avoidance—unintentional though it may be—only serves to heighten patient
fears of impending death.9
As a consequence of these concerns and inadequacies among physicians,
more often than not, issues of “existential care” are left to the nursing staff. 10
However, even in the daily hospital bed environment, it takes a special level
of sensitivity for the nurses and health care assistants to understand questions
raised by the patients, often indirectly, regarding the depth and severity of
their distress over their terminal illness. 11 Once understood, it remains for the
nursing staff to devise a procedure for providing empathetic support—

THE SANCTITY OF LIFE AND THE CRIMINAL LAW: THE LEGACY OF GLANVILLE WILLIAMS 296,
305-11 (Dennis J. Baber & Jeremy Horder eds., 2013). See generally JONATHAN HERRING,
CARING AND THE LAW 46-68 (2013) [hereinafter HERRING, CARING AND THE LAW] (discussing
the origins of the ethics of care).
4. Rousseau, supra note 2, at 224-25.
5. Id. at 225.
6. Id.
7. Id.
8. Id.
9. Id.; see also Mark A. Hall, Law, Medicine, and Trust, 55 STAN. L. REV. 463, 477-82
(2002) (explaining the importance of trust in patient-caregiver relationships).
10. See Rob Houtepen & David Hendrikx, Nurses and the Virtues of Dealing with
Existential Questions in Terminal Palliative Care, 10 NURSING ETHICS 377, 377 (2003) (defining
existential care situations as “cases where the patient’s question has such an existential, dramatic
and personal purport, that the nurse experiences a special appeal to specific personal qualities in
offering existential support”); see also Dean Whitehead, Beyond the Metaphysical: HealthPromoting Existential Mechanisms and Their Impact on the Health Status of Clients, 12 J.
CLINICAL NURSING 678, 678 (2003) (noting that existentialism, in a health context, means
“maintaining or heightening the overall positive well-being of an individual”). In the context of
existential questions, “patients tend to talk to nurses while they are still uncertain themselves
about the nature of their wants and needs. Houtepen & Hendrikx, supra note 10, at 382. Thus,
nurses’ communication with patients is of a more open and undetermined character than
physicians’ communication.” Id.
11. Houtepen & Hendrikx, supra note 10, at 381.
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especially when a sense of an ending, fin de siècle, pervades.12

Alleviating Suffering
th

While autonomy emerged in the 20 century as the dominant or
capstone principle in biomedical ethics—supporting and complementing
beneficence, non-malfeasance, and distributive justice13—it is well to
reconsider its pre-eminence in complex cases of refractory pain. Indeed, once
cases are presented where one’s quality of life is so severely diminished
because of suffering, it is proper to advance an argument that necessitates
reconfiguring or enhancing autonomy so that compassion becomes the
operative bioethical principle in decision making at this level. 14 Accordingly,
in cases where end-of-life pain is intractable, efforts to address this condition
and thereby assure a dignified death become a paramount state interest. 15
The goal of alleviating suffering, if acknowledged as a right to relief,
requires action by the state and the health care providers and imposes upon
them a co-ordinate responsibility to make prudential judgments that validate
this right.16 Acknowledging and honoring such a right then becomes an act of
“responsible benevolence,”17 or compassion, which is properly seen as
complementing the duty to undertake actions that benefit the dying patient.18
The duty to relieve pain is acknowledged as the “least disputed and the most
universal of the moral obligations of the physician.”19 In reality, end-of-life

12. Id. at 381-85.
13. See Albert R. Jonsen, A History of Bioethics as Discipline and Discourse, in BIOETHICS:
AN INTRODUCTION TO THE HISTORY, METHODS, AND PRACTICE 3, 11 (Nancy S. Jecker et al.
eds., 2007) (explaining that bioethicists “worked out a general approach to ethical reasoning by
affirming the relevance of a set of principles, namely, respect for autonomy, beneficence,
malfeasance, and justice”); see also GEORGE P. SMITH II, BIOETHICS AND THE LAW: MEDICAL,
SOCIO-LEGAL AND PHILOSOPHICAL DIRECTIONS FOR A BRAVE NEW WORLD 6-9 (1993)
(explaining that the three duties within the field of bioethics are autonomy, beneficence, and
justice).
14. See Lois L. Shepherd, Sophie’s Choices: Medical and Legal Responses to Suffering, 72
NOTRE DAME L. REV. 103, 106 (1996) [hereinafter Shepherd, Sophie’s Choices] (“Once we
decide that the suffering is sufficiently severe and the quality of life substantially diminished,
then we are justified in treating the individual sufferer differently; we are justified in making
decisions that erode autonomy and equality in the name of providing relief from suffering.”).
15. See id. at 118 (“Autonomy is firmly grounded in our Constitution’s protection of
individual liberty; accordingly, liberty interests have been relied upon to support a
Constitutional right to physician-assisted suicide and withdrawal of life support.”).
16. Id. at 146-47.
17. See LIEZL VAN ZYL, DEATH AND COMPASSION: A VIRTUE-BASED APPROACH TO
EUTHANASIA 197-98 (2000) (“For euthanasia to be an act of responsible benevolence, it has to
be considered as a last resort, when nothing else can be done to provide sufficient relief from
suffering.”).
18. DAVID C. THOMASMA & GLENN C. GRABER, EUTHANASIA: TOWARD AN ETHICAL
SOCIAL POLICY 192-94 (1990); see also RICHARD A. EPSTEIN, MORTAL PERIL: OUR
INALIENABLE RIGHT TO HEALTH CARE? 304-05 (1997) (asserting that consenting terminally ill
patients “need” to be allowed or assisted to end their lives whenever “a rational agent could
prefer death to life”).
19. THOMASMA & GRABER, supra note 18, at 193 (quoting Edmund D. Pellegrino, The
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autonomy is actually fortified by and through this new right of compassion.
Of necessity, then, compassion becomes the denominator in health care
decisions for end-of-life care20 and directs that efforts should be undertaken
which not only refrain from causing pain or suffering but relieve it as well.21
II. LEGAL CARING RESPONSES IN A JUST SOCIETY
American history shows rather remarkably that instead of being
perceived as vital to maintenance of a just society, the capacity to care has
been often seen as antithetical to it.22 There “has been a deformation of both
the private ethic of care and the very public ethic of legal justice”23—all as a
direct result of this attitude. This, in turn, has meant that not only have the
ideals and practices of justice been uncaring, but the ideals and practices of
care “have been unjust” with a “deflation of both virtues” resulting.24 Rather
than viewing caregiving as an emotional, morally arbitrary response, it should
be more properly accepted as an ethical activity—with the beliefs and the
values of care accepted as “integral to the development of just people and a
just society.”25 Indeed, care or compassion must be recognized as a universal

Clinical Ethics of Pain Management in the Terminally Ill, 17 HOSP. FORMULARY 1493, 1493
(1982)).
20. Id. at 126.
21. MARGARET P. BATTIN, ENDING LIFE: ETHICS AND THE WAY WE DIE 90-91 (2005)
[hereinafter BATTIN, ENDING LIFE]. See Robin M. Henig, A Life-or-Death Situation, N.Y.
TIMES MAG., July 21, 2013, at 27 (describing Margaret Battin’s personal family tradgedy of being
forced to deal with her husband’s medical condition—since 2008—as a quadripilegic and her
distress in attempting to honor and to be responsive to her husband’s ambiguous and fluctuating
communcations regarding the continuation or cessation of his medical treatment. Discerning
what is an informed and abiding decision by her husband to die from a response to transient
despair is problematic).
22. See ROBIN WEST, CARING FOR JUSTICE 9 (1997) (“For most of our history . . . our
capacity to care has not been regarded as necessary to the capacity to do justice (indeed, it is
more typically regarded as antithetical to it) . . . .”). For a discussion of society’s views on the
compatibility of justice and care, see MICHAEL D. FINE, A CARING SOCIETY?: CARE AND THE
DILEMMAS OF HUMAN SERVICE IN THE 21ST CENTURY 52-74 (2007) (“Justice is portrayed in
many of these discussions as an essentially masculine value involving the application of abstract
and impersonal principles to the public world, while the ideals of care are seen as values deriving
from the personal and private world of the home and family . . . . In this dichotomous way, care
came to be seen as an essentially feminine perspective, emphasizing the ties between people
rather than their autonomy.”); and see also JONATHAN HERRING, OLDER PEOPLE IN LAW AND
SOCIETY 127 (2009) (discussing generally the disparate focuses of the ethics of justice and the
ethics of care, but concluding that the two separate ethics are interdependent in the care context:
“it is so important that those sympathetic to an ethic of care emphasize the importance of
upholding justice within relationships”).
23. WEST, supra note 22, at 9.
24. Id.
25. FINE, supra note 22, at 63 (quoting Margaret Moore, The Ethics of Care and Justice, 20
WOMEN & POL. 1, 14 (1999)); see also HERRING, supra note 22, at 124-27 (discussing five
aspects relating to an ethic of care). Specifically, Herring states that “the values that are
promoted within an ethic of care are not isolated autonomy or the pursuance of individualized
rights, but rather the promotion of caring, mutuality, and interdependence.” H ERRING, supra
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moral principle,26 which is vital to the very fabric of social justice. 27
Within every adjudication, it has been suggested that neutral principles
of law, or those standards that transcend the instant case, should operate.28
Perhaps these principles or standards are to be found within the very
principle of equity;29 and from equity flows—arguably—mercy, sympathy,
compassion, humaneness or love. 30 David Hume, an eighteenth century
British philosopher, opined that the basis for a system of justice and social
solidarity was, in fact, tied to expressions of natural sympathy for others. 31
Arthur Schopenhauer, the German philosopher, maintained that compassion
“is the real basis of all voluntary justice.”32 Accordingly, for an action to have
moral value, it must derive from compassion. 33
Defined as an acknowledgment of another’s suffering, which prompts a
response to assist in alleviating the suffering, compassion is often regarded as
the motivation for subsequent merciful acts.34 Mercy is oftentimes used
synonymously with compassion or benevolence. 35 Indeed, acts of this nature
note 22, at 126. See also HERRING, CARING AND THE LAW, supra note 3, at 320-22 (discussing
the idea of social justice).
26. See FINE, supra note 22, at 60-61 (“The principles of care should be able to provide
universal moral guidelines if it can be shown that they meet two essential tests. First, the
principles of care must be able to provide moral guidance on important decisions . . . . Second,
they must be capable of being developed as a set of abstract principles that could be employed
for regulating public life.”); ALBERT R. JONSEN, THE NEW MEDICINE AND THE OLD ETHICS
126 (1990) (discussing in care how to balance competence and compassion, stating “[c]ompassion
must be circumscribed, just as competence is restrained. The circumscription does not mean any
diminution of human feeling, but instead its universalization”).
27. See MARIAN BARNES, CARING AND SOCIAL JUSTICE 158 (2006) (“Care-giving makes a
significant contribution to social well-being and the achievement of social justice—not only
directly through support received by particular individuals which can contribute to their capacity
to resist oppression and participate in social life, but also by offering practical examples of an
ethical basis for social relations which recognize equality as an objective to be achieved.”).
28. Herbert Wechsler, Toward Neutral Principles of Constitutional Law, 73 HARV. L. REV.
1, 17, 29 (1959).
29. See generally WILLIAM Q. DEFUNIAK, HANDBOOK ON MODERN EQUITY, ch. 1 (2d ed.
1956) (discussing equity and jurisprudence); Garrard Glenn & Kenneth Redden, Equity: A Visit
to the Founding Fathers, 31 VA. L. REV. 753, 756 (1945) (“Equity exists . . . for corrections of
situations ‘wherein the law, by reason of its universality, is deficient.’”). Equity may be defined
as not only “the quality of being equal or fair . . .” but, “given in accordance with natural justice .
. . something fair and right.” V OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY 358 (2nd ed. 1989).
30. See Steven Tudor, Modes of Mercy, 28 AUSTRL. J. LEGAL PHIL. 79, 95 (2003) (discussing
the term “mercy” and its connotations).
31. DAVID HUME, A TREATISE OF HUMAN NATURE 293-307 (L.A. Selby-Bigge ed., 1896).
32. ARTHUR SCHOPENHAUER, ON THE BASIS OF MORALITY 144 (E.F.J. Payne trans.,
Hackett Publishing 1998) (1965) (emphasis removed); see WILLIAM S. SAHAKIAN & MABEL
LEWIS SAHAKIAN, IDEAS OF THE GREAT PHILOSOPHERS 49 (1993) (summarizing
Schopenhauer’s philosophy).
33. SCHOPENHAUER, supra note 32, at 144.
34. Tudor, supra note 30, at 81. See also Patrick Guinan, The Christian Origin of Medical
Compassion, 5 NAT’L CATHOLIC BIOETHICS Q. 243, 243 (2005) (discussing the role of
compassion in medicine); Martha C. Nussbaum, Compassion: The Basic Social Emotion, 13 SOC.
PHIL. & POL’Y 27, 37 (1996) (discussing compassion and its relationship to justice).
35. Tudor, supra note 30, at 81.
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have been termed “responsible benevolence”36 or “compassionate mercy.”37
For others, charity is seen as the ultimate value in caring for the dying;38
and they suggest beneficence and benevolence may combine, properly, to
become “loving charity.”39 When there is suffering, its elimination or
management is central to a caring response and can well be seen as trumping
the biomedical principle of autonomy.40
Modernly, it has been urged that sympathy and compassion must be
integrated into contemporary law.41 A contemporary and principled rule of
law, then, needs notions of decency and compassion within its sinews 42 and
does not have to conflict with a rule of love. 43 Others have called for the law
to be empathetic or to incorporate concepts of love, altruism, and
sympathy.44

36. VAN ZYL, supra note 17, at 197.
37. BATTIN, ENDING LIFE, supra note 21, at 66; see also TIMOTHY E. QUILL, DEATH AND
DIGNITY: MAKING CHOICES AND TAKING CHARGE 129-32 (1994) (illustrating how the difficult
decision of how to approach end-of-life care with a loved one can be perceived as both agonizing
and admirable).
38. See Edmund D. Pellegrino, Decision at the End of Life: The Use and Abuse of The
Concept of Futility, in THE DIGNITY OF THE DYING PERSON 219, 222-23 (Juan De Dios Vial
Correa & Elio Sgreccia eds., 2000) [hereinafter Pellegrino, Decision] (explaining that Christians
have an obligation to care for the sick and the vulnerable).
39. Id. at 225, 241.
40. Shepherd, Sophie’s Choices, supra note 14, at 119-24 (analyzing the constitutional,
medical, and ethical conflicts that exist between the right to be free from suffering and the right
to autonomy). See generally du Bois-Pedain, supra note 3, at 319-24 (discussing the tenuous
relationship between a doctor’s moral and legal duties in caregiving and alleviating end-of-life
suffering).
41. Laurence Tribe, Revisiting the Rule of Law, 64 N.Y.U. L. REV. 726, 729-30 (1989)
(criticizing the Supreme Court of the United States for taking an unbending position on the Rule
of Law—one that fails to account for “sympathy and compassion”).
42. Id. at 731.
43. Id. at 729; see also SAMUEL FLEISCHACKER, INTEGRITY AND MORAL RELATIVISM 7-8
(Michael Krausz ed. 1992) (discussing how both cultural relativism and individual desires impact
ethical orientations); JOHN FLETCHER, SITUATION ETHICS: THE NEW MORALITY 69-71 (1966)
(arguing that, so long as one’s intention to act is anchored in love, the end result justifies the
means); Hugh LaFollette, The Truth in Ethical Relativism, 22 J. SOC. PHIL. 146, 146 (1991)
(arguing that a “cultivated moral judgment” should be the normative standard of conduct, rather
than a routine application of existing moral rules).
44. See Lynne N. Henderson, Legality and Empathy, 85 MICH. L. REV. 1574, 1576 (1987)
(arguing that empathy, or lack thereof, is helpful in understanding many important Supreme
Court decisions in the last century). For Adam Smith, the process of judging involves a lesson in
learning the importance of impartiality by imagining how an impartial spectator would act in a
particular situation: “Moral judgment is either approval or disapproval of an action. Judging is a
complex matter and forms the last step in a process which relies upon human beings’ capacity for
sympathizing. Sympathy does not mean compassion; Smith defines it in a neutral way to mean
what we call empathy.” James E. Alvey, The ‘New View’ of Adam Smith and the Development
of his Views Over Time, in NEW PERSPECTIVES ON ADAM SMITH’S THE THEORY OF MORAL
SENTIMENTS 66, 71 (Geoff Cockfield et al. eds., 2007) (internal citation omitted). See RICHARD
A. POSNER, HOW JUDGES THINK 117 (2008) [hereinafter POSNER, JUDGES] (observing that an
element of judicial decision making is “good judgment,” which is a compound of several
qualities, including empathy and common sense).
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One of the inherent weaknesses of the rule of law has been said to be its
all too often efforts to distance itself from human experience. 45 Certainly, by
introducing human values or attitudes into the judicial process, a strong claim
could be made that these elements might well conflict with the ideal of
judging, which is sustained by rational and objective argumentation, not by
feelings and emotions.46 Indeed, empathetic discourse in the courtroom may
well be seen as either irrelevant or merely as “policy” and, thus, treated
dismissively.47

Principles, Emotions, and The Holmesian Caveat
While principles provide the foundational framework for standards of
normative conduct, feelings are important when individuals or micro issues
arise which, in turn, test the extent to which principles are valid in their
application within the context of a given situation or norm of conduct. 48 It is
asserted that “the morally good person is not just principled, but also
compassionate.”49 In addition, that person not only exhibits “practical
wisdom”50 but “common sense”51 in assuring patient dignity or quality of life
45. See JOHN T. NOONAN, JR., PERSONS AND MASKS OF THE LAW: CARDOZO, HOLMES,
JEFFERSON, AND WYTHE AS MAKERS OF THE MASKS 111-51 (1976) (describing how the law
dehumanizes the very people to whom it applies, such as, for example, Helen Palsgraf, the
blinded plaintiff in Palsgraf v. Long Island R.R., 162 N.E. 99 (1928), who is referred to simply as
“A” in the Restatement of Torts as presented to the American Law Institute in 1929).
46. See Benjamin Zipursky, DeShaney and The Jurisprudence of Compassion, 65 N.Y.U. L.
REV. 1101, 1122 (1990) (“An apparent problem with advocating the judicial embrace of
compassion is that it seems to conflict with the ideal of judging as a rational and objective
activity.”). But see MARTIN L. HOFFMAN, EMPATHY AND MORAL DEVELOPMENT:
IMPLICATIONS FOR CARING AND JUSTICE 270 (2000) (“Empathy can contribute to both sides of
caring-justice dilemmas because of empathy’s congruence with both, though it is less likely to
contribute to the justice side when productivity is the issue, as is usually the case in our
society.”).
47. Henderson, supra note 44, at 1588 (“Law as a closed system that is self-referential can
draw the line in such a way as to dismiss empathic discourse or understanding as ‘irrelevant’ or
as ‘policy’ argument beyond the auspices of the law.”). See David Brooks, The Limits of
Empathy, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 30, 2011, http://www.nytimes.com/2011/09/30/opinion/brooks-thelimits-of-empathy.html (referencing a recent paper by Professor Jesse Prinz, of the Graduate
Center Philosophy department at the City University of New York, who argued that empathy
“subverts justice” where it allows the individual “to experience the illusion of moral progress
without having to do the nasty work of making moral judgments” and “to experience delicious
moral emotions without confronting the weaknesses in our nature that prevent us from actually
acting upon them”).
48. FIONA RANDALL & R.S. DOWNIE, PALLIATIVE CARE ETHICS: A GOOD COMPANION 1213 (1996) (“Principles provide the framework, but we must remember our feelings; the morally
good person is not just principled, but also compassionate.”).
49. Id. at 13.
50. Id. at 24 (“As a result of their professional experience those involved in palliation may be
able to offer a range of advice and discussion based on practical wisdom generated by interaction
between their own personality, and their experience of health care and life in general.”).
51. Id. at 73 (“Common sense has a part to play in health care ethics . . . . Ordinary reasoning
and moral intuition lead to the conclusion that the effective relief of suffering in terminal illness
may sometimes justify the use of measures which entail a risk of shortening life.”).
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is preserved throughout all palliative care treatments. 52
The best way to assure this mandate or goal of compassion throughout
cases of adjusted palliative care management is to embrace a test of medical
utility in determining what end-stage options should be made available as
treatment.53 Accordingly, a benefits-to-burdens/risk calculus should be
utilized to assess the utility of one medical treatment over another.54
Anchoring such an evaluation should be the doctrine of medical futility,
which acknowledges the practical limits of medical treatment in all cases. 55
While compassion is experienced and evaluated subjectively, 56 it need
not stigmatize a valid legal theory.57 Indeed, in the case of DeShaney v.
Winnebago County Department of Social Services,58 Justice Harry
Blackmun, in dissent, addressed the importance of compassion in judicial
analysis and interpretation by observing that “compassion need not be exiled
from the province of judging.”59 He went further and stated that when courts
remove “natural sympathy” from a case, they are thereby prevented “from
recognizing either the facts of the case before it or the legal norms that
should apply to those facts.”60
Eschewing emotion as a dominant vector of force in truth seeking in
law,61 Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr. urged that the reasoning behind a
particular rule’s adoption “ought to be of paramount importance.”62 And,
52. Id. at 71; Annette F. Street & David W. Kissane, Constructions of Dignity in End-of-Life
Care, 17 J. PALLIATIVE CARE 93, 95, 99 (2001).
53. RANDALL & DOWNIE, supra note 48, at 192 (asserting that medical utility “include[s]
patient need and the ability to benefit from both the process of care and the specific
interventions of care”).
54. Id. at 116-18.
55. Id.
56. Zipursky, supra note 46, at 1142.
57. Id. at 1147; see also Lois Shepherd, Face to Face: A Call for Radical Responsibility in
Place of Compassion, 77 ST. JOHN’S L. REV. 445, 449, 457 (2003) [hereinafter Shepherd, Face to
Face] (calling for a greater prominence for caring responses in law and a sense of “shared
humanity”).
58. 489 U.S. 189 (1989).
59. Id. at 213 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
60. Id. at 212.
61. See OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES, JR., THE ESSENTIAL HOLMES: SELECTIONS FROM THE
LETTERS, SPEECHES, JUDICIAL OPINIONS, AND OTHER WRITINGS OF OLIVER WENDELL
HOLMES, JR. 119 (Richard A. Posner ed. 1992) [hereinafter HOLMES, SELECTIONS] (asserting
that with regard to seeking the truth in law, “it is useful to omit the emotion and ask ourselves
what those [imperfect social generalizations that make up our system of morality] are and how
far they are confirmed by fact accurately ascertained”).
62. Stephen W. Smith, Some Realism about End of Life: The Current Prohibition and The
Euthanasia Underground, 33 AM. J. L. & MED. 55, 55 (2007). See RICHARD A. POSNER, LAW,
PRAGMATISM AND DEMOCRACY 107 (2003) (arguing ordinary people have little interest in
complex policy and—with half of the population with I.Q.s of below 100—limited intellectual
depth); Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr., The Path of the Law, Address Before the Boston University
School of Law (Jan. 8, 1897), in 110 HARV. L. REV. 991, 992-93 (1897) [hereinafter Holmes, The
Path of the Law] (giving examples to illustrate the practical importance of understanding the
reasons of the law). See RICHARD J. HERRNSTEIN & CHARLES MURRAY, THE BELL CURVE:
INTELLIGENCE AND CLASS STRUCTURE IN AMERICAN LIFE 386 (1994) (discussing how large
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when the reasons for structuring the rule have disappeared, it is improper to
maintain the rule “from blind imitation of the past.”63
Surely, the reasons behind the prohibitions and restricted use of terminal
sedation as a means of care in palliative treatment of patients in end-stage
care need to be, at minimum, re-evaluated and even expanded to include
such care of terminally-ill patients suffering severe psychological distress. An
individual suffering at the end of his or her life may display forms of
emotional, psychological, and existential suffering such as despair,
helplessness, isolation, and loss of self-respect.64 The legal system should
acknowledge a right not to suffer.65 Accordingly, physicians should have a
professional responsibility to validate this right to the extent that they can
under sound medical practice, and alleviate the suffering.
III. A CONTEMPORARY MODEL IN LEGAL DECISION MAKING
The law should accord a greater “caring response”66 or a “sense of
shared humanity”67 in its interpretation and application. Indeed, a caring
response is one of several humanistic values essential to sustaining the rule of
law.68 Oftentimes, however, such values are challenged as being in conflict
with abstruse “moralistic abstractions about liberty, equality and dignity.”69
Unquestionably, decisions in health care concerning the maintenance of
life and the hastening of death often pose complicated moral questions,
which are anchored in normative reasoning, which—in turn—may, or may
not, be relevant or cogent because of changing contemporary values. 70 If
moral reasoning is either ambiguous or ineffectual, courts will tend to rely on
“moral intuitions,” or “assumptions about intrinsic normative order” found
proportions of people with the type of behaviors and problems that dominate the nation’s social
policy agenda have limited cognitive ability).
63. Holmes, The Path of the Law, supra note 62, at 1000. See generally ROGER S.
MAGNUSSON, ANGELS OF DEATH: EXPLAINING THE EUTHANASIA UNDERGROUND 261 (2002)
(discussing the complexity of rules against euthanasia in context of suffering AIDS patients who
prefer to choose death over life).
64. VAN ZYL, supra note 17, at 196.
65. THOMASMA & GRABER, supra note 18, at 192.
66. See Shepherd, Face to Face, supra note 57, at 449 (arguing that caring responses should
play a bigger role in law and policy decisions); see also du Bois-Pedain, supra note 3, at 324
(“[E]ven if care morality and its demands can only be imperfectly translated into legal norms,
the law . . . must strive to do so even at the cost of some compromise to legal certainty and to the
internal requirements of rule-based governance.”).
67. See Shepherd, Face to Face, supra note 57, at 456-57 (explaining the differences between
compassion and pity).
68. Neil S. Siegel, The Virtue of Judicial Statesmanship, 86 TEX. L. REV. 959, 969-71 (2008);
see also Kathryn Webb Bradley, Knowing Law’s Limit: Comments on “Forgiveness: Integral to
Close Relationships and Inimical to Justice?”, 16 VA. J. SOC. POL’Y & L. 322, 323-26 (2009)
(arguing that the notion of forgiveness becomes complicated in the family law context,
particularly with regard to divorce proceedings).
69. Siegel, supra note 68, at 1030.
70. Steven D. Smith, De-Moralized: Glucksberg in the Malaise, 106 MICH. L. REV. 1571,
1589 (2008) [hereinafter Smith, De-Moralized].
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implicitly “in the natural course of life.”71 Determining normative
assumptions that animate moral judgments is a difficult task, and analytical
frameworks of this nature that rely on non-verifiable subjective values often
invite conflict.72
In order to lend greater legal precision to their analyses, courts can
choose to embrace the philosophy of Holmes, which prizes logic over
experience.73 By adhering to legal formalism, moral judgments are avoided
altogether74—in large part because there is an awareness that it is very
difficult to safeguard and sustain social solidarity if emotional values are
given recognition in the processes of judicial decision making.75 If, however,
formalism is rejected, judicial deference can then be given to “tradition and
convention”76 as a construct for discerning moral convictions or discovering
shared humanity instead of a rigid adherence to “academic reasoning.”77
The best approach to, or model for, judicial decision making is one that
achieves a balance between logical reasoning and, when appropriate, “critical
morality” as opposed to traditional conventional morality.78 As such, courts
must endeavor to apply a situation ethic rather than an unyielding and rigid
normative standard, and then proceed to acknowledge love or agape as the
controlling moral principle in all judicial decision making. 79 Stated otherwise,
guided by compassion or humaneness, the judiciary should interpret everevolving social values and the social conditions that shape those values. 80

71. Id. at 1589 (internal quotation marks omitted).
72. Id. at 1590.
73. See HOLMES, SELECTIONS supra note 61, at 237, 239 (explaining the evolution of law
based on tradition to law based on logic).
74. Smith, De-Moralized, supra note 70, at 1589-90.
75. See, e.g., Siegel, supra note 68, at 979 (stating that “[j]udicial statesmanship means that
judges must seek not only the “right answer” to legal questions as a matter of professional
reason but also an answer that sustains the social legitimacy of law”); Cass R. Sunstein, Due
Process Traditionalism, 106 MICH. L. REV. 1543, 1544 (2008) (citing Washington v. Glucksberg,
521 U.S. 702, 720-21 (1997); Michael H. v. Gerald D., 491 U.S. 110, 122-24 (1989); Moore v. City
of E. Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494, 503 (1977)) (describing how the Supreme Court has appealed to
arguments of tradition rather than emotion); see also WILLIAM F. SULLIVAN, EYE OF THE
HEART: KNOWING THE HUMAN GOOD IN THE EUTHANASIA DEBATE 136 (2005) (discussing the
role of emotions in evaluations and their objectivity).
76. Smith, De-Moralized, supra note 70, at 1590.
77. Id.
78. See id. (explaining how courts side with “tradition and convention,” but academics side
with “critical morality” and “reasoning”). Judge Richard Posner suggests that judges employ a
type of reasoning termed “cultural cognition.” POSNER, JUDGES, supra note 44, at 116. Cultural
cognition is “a valid though flawed sense of knowledge” because when a judge uses cultural
cognition, he is allowed to consider his personal vision of those policies important to him in
order to advance his model of a good society. Id. at 117. “The personal, the emotional and the
intuitive” are factors used in judicial making—with the intuitive being a salient factor in
appellate review. Id. at 120.
79. See FLETCHER, supra note 43, at 52 (defining “situation ethic” as a method of decision
making that does not rely strictly on pre-conceived rules, but rather asks “how to do good for
whom; not what is love but how to do the most loving thing possible in the situation”).
80. Siegel, supra note 68, at 981.
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These values and conditions necessarily change with the facts of each case
and, thus, so do the extent to which compassion and humaneness are
pertinent. The ultimate goal of judicial decision making should, in the end, be
a “practical realization of the rule of law.”81
IV. DETERMINING PATIENT VALUES AND BEST MEDICAL INTERESTS
Patient values must always be viewed as the baseline for developing and
pursuing patient-centered palliative care for terminal illness. 82 Best patient
care, ideally, is adjusted to a patient’s changing medical condition.83 Palliative
care provides adjusted care by endeavoring to relieve end-stage suffering of
all kinds—physical and psychological.84 If relief from suffering is viewed as a
patient right,85 then, health care providers and the state have a basic
responsibility to establish policies designed to validate this right and follow a
course of action that seeks to honor a patient’s desire for an easeful death.
Indeed, there is a medical duty to act to benefit the dying patient, for relief of
pain “is the least disputed and most universal of the moral obligations of the
physician.”86 Accordingly, both law and medicine must set standards or
protocols that allow for the wider adoption and use of terminal sedation as an
efficacious and humane practice for end-stage care of hospice patients.87
Ultimately, the determination of the parameters of a patient’s best

81. Id. at 979; see also George P. Smith, II, Judicial Decisionmaking in the Age of
Biotechnology, 13 NOTRE DAME J.L. ETHICS & PUB. POL’Y 93, 101 (1999) (explaining that the
law serves to define and protect individual rights, ensure public order, resolve disputes, optimize
economic efficiency, dispense justice, and provide for a structure for preventing or compensating
injury, among other things).
82. Timothy E. Quill, Physician-Assisted Death in the United States: Are the Existing “Last
Resorts” Enough?, 38 HASTINGS CTR. REP. 17, 21 (2008) [hereinafter Quill, Physician-Assisted
Death].
83. THE PRESIDENT’S COUNCIL ON BIOETHICS, TAKING CARE: ETHICAL CAREGIVING IN
OUR AGING SOCIETY 216-17 (2005); see also THOMASMA & GRABER, supra note 18, at 192
(discussing the right to control decisions regarding one’s own medical conditions).
84. See Evan D. Anderson & Corey S. Davis, Breaking the Cycle of Preventable Suffering:
Fulfilling the Principle of Balance, 24 TEMP. INT’L. & COMP. L. J. 329, 329-30 (2010) (discussing
the use of therapeutic opioids in palliative care to prevent suffering); see also Joanne Kenen, A
New Focus on Easing the Pain, WASH. POST, July 3, 2007, http://www.washingtonpost.com/wpdyn/content/article/2007/06/29/AR2007062902064_pf.html (stating that the “main goal [of
palliative care] is to improve a patient’s quality of life” by “managing pain, nausea or respiratory
problems better”).
85. THOMASMA & GRABER, supra note 18, at 192.
86. Margaret P. Battin, Euthanasia: The Fundamental Issues, in READINGS IN HEALTH
CARE ETHICS 363, 363 (Elisabeth Boetzkes & Wilfred J. Waluchow eds., 2000). See generally du
Bois-Pedain, supra note 3, at 321 (“The explanation [of the recognition of care morality within
the criminal law] . . . lies, quite simply, in the presence of the doctor’s duty of care which exhorts
him to relieve the patient’s suffering. It is this duty which counterbalances and ultimately
ovverides certain prohibitions of actions.”).
87. Paul Rousseau, Existential Suffering and Palliative Sedation: A Brief Commentary with
a Proposal for Clinical Guidelines, 18 AM. J. HOSPICE & PALLIATIVE CARE 151, 152-53 (2001).
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medical interests is shaped by policies of reasonableness88 and compassion.89
Neither reasonableness nor compassion are capable of a precise formulation,
but rather are tied inextricably to issues of proportionality or cost/benefit
analysis,90 which, in turn, must remain fact-sensitive and shaped by the
“accepted standards of medical . . . practice” applicable within each medical
case presented.91

A. Medical Futility and Proportionality
The popular notion within American society—that there is a required
prescription to treat under all circumstances—needs to be re-evaluated and
brought into contemporary focus through acceptance of the doctrine of
medical futility.92 Under this recognized doctrine, when medical care is
complemented by the test of proportionality imbedded presently in the
principle of double effect,93 the central treatment question becomes whether
the burdens of treatment clearly outweigh its benefits to the patient and
would be inhumane if continued.94 In those cases where medical treatment is

88. GEORGE P. SMITH, II, FINAL CHOICES: AUTONOMY IN HEALTH CARE DECISIONS 109
(1989) [hereinafter SMITH, FINAL CHOICES].
89. See EDMUND D. PELLEGRINO & DAVID C. THOMASMA, FOR THE PATIENT’S GOOD:
THE RESTORATION OF BENEFICENCE IN HEALTH CARE 55 (1988) (describing compassion as
one of the ideal characteristics that physicians should possess in addressing patients’ wishes). See
also MARGARET SOMERVILLE, THE ETHICAL IMAGINATION: JOURNEYS OF THE HUMAN SPIRIT
222 (2009) (observing that “compassion and courage are companions”).
90. See BARRY R. SCHALLER, UNDERSTANDING BIOETHICS AND THE LAW 4 (2008) (using
the term “ethinomics” to “describe the convergence of ethics and economics” and recognizing
the concern of some that acknowledging this convergence could dehumanize the process of
medical decision making); Joseph Boyle, Enriching Proportionalism Through Christian
Narrative in Bioethics: The Decisive Development in Richard McCormick’s Moral Theory?, 14
CHRISTIAN BIOETHICS 302, 304, 306-08 (2008) (discussing proportionalism as a consequentialist
form of moral analysis where, in order to reach a moral judgment, all aspects of an action—
including its side effects—are compared or balanced in terms of their ultimate effect on the
human good).
91. SMITH, FINAL CHOICES, supra note 88, at 173-74; see Lawrence J. Schneiderman et al.,
Medical Futility: Its Meaning and Ethical Implications, in BIOETHICS: AN INTRODUCTION TO
THE HISTORY, METHODS, AND PRACTICE 408, 409 (Nancy S. Jecker et al. eds., 2d ed. 2007)
(explaining that the doctrine of medical futility can be understood and applied in a practical and
common sense way).
92. See DANIEL CALLAHAN, THE TROUBLED DREAM OF LIFE 199 (1993) (“There is a
deeply embedded presumption in medicine: when life is at stake, there should always be a bias in
favor of treatment.”); id. at 203-06 (explaining the five stages of rejection of life-extending
treatment, ranging from “a refusal to respond to all health threats” to “an eagerness to pursue
any medical treatment”).
93. The principle of double effect, stated succinctly, sets forth a ethical framework for
determining when it is permissible to undertake action that achieves a good result (e.g., the
alleviation of pain and suffering of end-stage illness) even though a negative or bad result (e.g., a
hastening of death) will flow from the initiating conduct. SMITH, FINAL CHOICES, supra note 88,
at 47-49, 55-59, 101-05. See also George P. Smith, II, Refractory Pain, Existential Suffering, and
Palliative Care: Releasing an Unbearable Lightness of Being, 20 CORNELL J. L. & PUB. POL’Y
469, 500 (2011) [hereinafter Smith, Refractory Pain] (explaining the doctrine of double effect).
94. For Callahan, testing the burdens and benefits of treatment modalities is tied ultimately
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seen as futile, terminal sedation should be recognized as but a part of endstage total symptom management and validated as an integral part of
palliative management. 95 Once end-stage, terminal suffering is managed
more effectively, the law must change the legal taxonomy and reliance on the
principle of double effect in testing whether assistance in ending life is capital
murder or euthanasia.96 Instead, the degree of necessity for providing
compassionate assistance to dying patients—together with an assessment of
the soundness of the medical judgment of the health care providers rendering
the assistance—should be pivotal in legal analysis of end-stage care. Indeed,
the central or “fundamental part” of the end-of-life “equation” for making
rational medical decisions must always be seen as “the patient’s quest for a
dignified death”97 or, alternatively, the “least worst death.”98 A good death is

to the principle of medical futility. CALLAHAN, supra note 92, at 215-16. A treatment is
medically futile and improper to undertake only if it will likely raise a strong probability of
death, extended pain, and suffering; extend a state of unconsciousness which is not curative; or
greatly increase the near certainty of “a bad death” despite a promise of an extension of life. Id.
at 201-02.
95. See Smith, Refractory Pain, supra note 93, at 474-76, 478 (arguing for the necessity of
terminal sedation as a form of palliative care in order to compassionately alleviate suffering and
“enhanc[e] patient autonomy”).
96. Under the principle of double effect, medical treatment is ethically permissible when: the
health care provider provides good or morally neutral care, intends a good effect to result and
not one which is untoward, and the good resulting from the initiating action is proportionate to
any consequential evil (i.e. a good or positive result may not be used as a direct causal
consequence of an evil result). See SMITH, FINAL CHOICES, supra note 88, at 101-03 (arguing
that the double effect principle should be replaced by a standard of reasonableness,
consideration of the best interests of the patient, and a cost/benefit analysis to decide what
“treatment or non-treatment should be pursued”).
97. TIMOTHY E. QUILL, DEATH AND DIGNITY: MAKING CHOICES AND TAKING CHARGE 51
(1993); see also Quill, Physician-Assisted Death, supra note 82, at 20-21 (noting that “[t]here are
two main clinical situations” where last-resort options potentially including physician-assisted
death may arise, namely, with “[p]atients who are worried about future suffering and wonder
what options would be available to them . . . [and p]atients who eventually experience suffering
that is unacceptable to them”).
98. MARGARET P. BATTIN, THE LEAST WORST DEATH: ESSAYS IN BIOETHICS ON THE END
OF LIFE 38 (1994); see also George P. Smith, II, All’s Well That Ends Well: Toward a Policy of
Assisted Rational Suicide or Merely Enlightened Self-Determination?, 22 U.C. DAVIS L. REV.
275, 418 (1989) (“Determining a patient’s best interests are thus grounded in policies of
reasonableness and humaneness. It is an inhumane and callous argument that protracts the
agony of death by using gastronomy tubes, nasogastrict tubes and other means of providing
alimentation under the guise of being efficacious treatment.”). With the legalization of assisted
suicide, Judge Richard Posner asserts—based on empirical reasoning and a utilitarian calculus—
that such action may lead to fewer rather than more suicides where physical incapacity is
implicated. RICHARD A. POSNER, AGING AND OLD AGE 243-51 (1995) [hereinafter POSNER,
AGING AND OLD AGE]. The argument advanced here is that those overwhelmed with the fear of
becoming totally incapacitated from terminal medical conditions are forced into a course of
action which means that they either kill themselves while still capable or face the distinct
prospect of ultimately becoming incompetent and losing their autonomy to die accordingly. Id.
Whether such a course of action would be cost-effective remains difficult to determine, however,
since the medical costs associated with administering this assistance could be borne by third
parties. Id.
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said, commonly, to be one that occurs “after a long and successful life, at
home, without violence or pain, with the dying person being at peace with his
environment and having at least some control over events.”99

B. The Right to Refuse Treatment
Rather than continue a quest to establish a constitutional right to
assisted suicide,100 perhaps—in the final analysis—the time-honored common
law right to refuse treatment should be seen as the corner stone for building a
more compassionate and enlightened ethic of understanding in managing
end-of-life issues.101 This right of refusal is not a right to hasten death, but
rather merely a right to resist unwanted physical invasions.102
With the passage of the Patient Self-Determination Act in 1990, 103
Congress took a bold first step to validate the right to refuse treatment. 104
This legislation strengthened patient autonomy by allowing newly-admitted
hospital and nursing home patients to choose whether they wished to accept
or refuse specified medical treatment during the course of their
confinement.105
Additional steps in building an arsenal to safeguard a framework for

99. Graham Scambler, Death on the Edge of the “Lifeworld,” in DEATH RITES AND RIGHTS
163, 172 (Belinda Brooks-Gordon et al. eds., 2007) (quoting Clive Seale & Sjaak van der Geest,
Good and Bad Death: An Introduction, 58 SOC. SCI. & MED. 883, 855 (2004)).
100. See, e.g., George J. Annas, The Bell Tolls for a Constitutional Right to PhysicianAssisted Suicide, 337 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1098, 1098 (1997) (“The debate about a constitutional
right to physician-assisted suicide, on the other hand, was abruptly ended on June 26, 1997, the
day the U.S. Supreme Court issued two unanimous rulings on the issue.”) (footnotes omitted).
101. See id. at 1102 (“The right to refuse treatment, on the other hand, is a long-recognized
right that physicians are legally and ethically required to honor. Patients have a right to insist
that their bodies not be invaded without their consent.”).
102. NEW YORK TASK FORCE ON LIFE & THE LAW, SUPPLEMENT TO WHEN DEATH IS
SOUGHT: ASSISTED SUICIDE AND EUTHANASIA IN THE MEDICAL CONTEXT 7 (2006), available

at

http://www.health.ny.gov/regulations/task_force/reports_publications/select_reports/assisted_sui
cide_and_euthanasia/docs/supplement.pdf; see also LOIS SHEPHERD, IF THAT EVER HAPPENS
TO ME: MAKING LIFE AND DEATH DECISIONS AFTER TERRI SCHIAVO 59-60 (2009) (“A
number of state courts recognizing the right to refuse treatment have chosen instead to rely on
the right against unwanted intrusions of the body found in the common law . . . , explicit rights to
privacy in state constitutions . . . , statutory rights, or some combination of these legal sources.”).
See NEIL M. GORSUCH, THE FUTURE OF ASSISTED SUICIDE AND EUTHANASIA 181-215 (2006)
(discussing case law addressing the intersection of the right to refuse treatment and the
“inviolability of life” with regards to competent and incompetent patients and those with and
without an intent to die).
103. Patient Self-Determination Act, Pub. L. 101-508, 104 Stat. 1388–115, 1388–204 (codified
at scattered sections of 42 U.S.C.) (2006).
104. See Lee Uzych, Book Review, 283 JAMA 2454, 2454 (2000) (reviewing LAURENCE P.
ULRICH, THE PATIENT SELF-DETERMINATION ACT: MEETING THE CHALLENGES OF PATIENT
CARE (1999)) (noting that to Ulrich “the spirit of the ‘Act’ is intended to achieve the
transformation of the patient from passive to highly active participant in the therapeutic
decision-making process”).
105. Id.
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principled decision making in end-of-life cases were taken by the
development of the Uniform Health Care Decisions Act,106 the successful
efforts of some states to enact pain relief statutes, 107 the Death with Dignity
statutes of Oregon108 and Washington,109 and the medical protocols for use of
palliative (hospice) care and terminal sedation. 110 These “weapons” in the
arsenal serve to protect and encourage sound, reasonable medical judgments
and, thus, in a very real way, balance physicians’ powers and protections with
patient rights of autonomy.

C. Utility, Common Sense, and Compassion
Utility,111 most assuredly, comes into play after medical conditions are

106. UNIF. HEALTH-CARE DECISIONS ACT §§ 1-19, 9 U.L.A. 93 (1993). The Uniform HealthCare Decisions Act has been adopted in some form by ten states. Thaddeus Mason Pope, A New
Revised Uniform Healthcare Decisions Act, MED. FUTILITY BLOG (Dec. 3, 2011),
http://medicalfutility.blogspot.com/2011/12/new-revised-uniform-healthcare.html.
The
Act
allows an attending physician to disregard a request for the initiation or continuation of care
when a determination by the physician is made that such action would be ineffective and
contrary to generally accepted “health care standards.” UNIF. HEALTH-CARE DECISIONS ACT §
7(f).
107. Some twenty-one states have pain relief laws—with eighteen allowing marijuana to be
used for medicinal purposes (e.g., the relief of pain). State Medical Marijuana Laws, NAT’L
CONF.
STATE
LEGISLATURES,
http://www.ncsl.org/issues-research/health/state-medicalmarijuana-laws.aspx (last visited May 31, 2013); see also Jessica Chiu et al., Access to
Therapeutic Opioids: A Plan for Donors, NGOs and Governments, 24 TEMP. INT’L. & COMP. L.
J. 417, 442 (2010) (indicating the need for clear goals and funding strategies at a national level in
order to make opioid medication more accessible to individuals who need it).
108. OR. REV. STAT. §§ 127.800(12), 127.805(1) (2011).
109. WASH. REV. CODE § 245.020 (2009). Although not declaring a constitutional right to die
with dignity, the Montana Supreme Court held on December 31, 2009, that—under the state’s
Rights of The Terminally Ill Act—competent terminally ill patients can request physician
assistance in obtaining a prescription for a lethal dose of medicine to be self-administered; and,
further, the Act shields physicians from civil or criminal liability for any such assistance. Baxter
v. Montana, 224 P.3d 1211, 1215 (Mont. 2009). The Vermont Legislature passed legislation
comparable to that in place in Oregon and Washingon in May 2013. VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 18, §
5281 (2013). See Paula Span, Vermont Passes ‘Aid in Dying’ Measure, N.Y. TIMES THE NEW
OLD
AGE
BLOG
(May
14,
2013,
10:18
AM),
http://newoldage.blogs.nytimes.com/2013/05/14/vermont-passes-aid-in-dying-measure/?_r=0
(“Vermont will become the fourth state to make it legal for a physician to prescribe lethal
medication to a terminally ill, mentally competent patient who wants to end his life.”).
110. See, e.g., Position Statements: Statement on Artificial Nutrition and Hydration Near the
End of Life, AM. ACAD. HOSPICE & PALLIATIVE MED. (Dec. 8, 2006),
http://www.aahpm.org/positions/default/nutrition.html (explaining the suggestions of the
American Academy of Palliative Medicine). See MARK LEVINE, AM. MED. ASS’N, REPORT OF
THE COUNCIL ON ETHICAL AND JUDICIAL AFFAIRS, SEDATION TO UNCONSCIOUSNESS IN ENDOF-LIFE CARE, CEJA REPORT 5-A-08, 6-7 (2008), for the suggestions of the American Medical
Association.
111. Medical utility may be defined “as the maximization of the welfare of patients in need of
treatment.” George P. Smith, II, Utility and the Principle of Medical Futility: Safeguarding
Autonomy and the Prohibition Against Cruel and Unusual Punishment, 12 J. CONTEMP.
HEALTH L. & POL’Y 1, 36 (1995) (internal citation omitted). Utilitarianism requires determining
which course of medical treatment will “produce the greatest benefit for the greatest number of
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assessed and evaluated and a treatment prognosis is charted. 112 It is within
the boundaries of utility that the principle of medical futility is tested and
determined to be efficacious or, as to a particular case, invalid. 113 Cost/benefit
(or, simply proportional) analysis of treatment options is central to a
determination of medical futility,114 since this determination is—first and
foremost—but a clinical judgment and not an encompassing moral evaluation
or principle on the “worthlessness” of a life.115 Whether the operative
normative standard for policy making be termed agape,116 charity,117
compassion,118 love,119 or mercy,120 the common or unifying denominator to
palliative care is a humane, morally responsible approach to dealing with
intractable suffering at the end-stage of life.
Good judgment is to be expected of judicial decision makers just as it is
for healthcare providers. As a quality in reasoning, good judgment is
characterized as “an elusive faculty best understood as a compound of
empathy, modesty, maturity, a sense of proportion, balance, a recognition of
human limitations, sanity, prudence, a sense of reality and common sense.”121

individuals.” Id.
112. Id. at 28 (explaining that utility should be determined by “weigh[ing] the gravity of the
harm in allowing lifesaving actions versus the utility of the benefits stemming from the actions,”
a balancing test which requires that the medical condition be thoroughly evaluated).
113. See id. (“The utility of the benefits would be measured in terms of an evaluation of the
positive consequences that flow to the threatened individual and to society. In truth, then, this
balancing test seeks to arrive at a cost-effective decision through a cost-benefit analysis.”)
(footnotes omitted).
114. See Vijay N. Joish & Gary M. Oderda, Cost Utility Analysis of Quality Adjusted Life
Years, 19 J. PAIN & PALLIATIVE CARE PHARMACOTHERAPY 57, 57 (2005) (explaining how
cost-benefit analysis can help allocate limited medical treatment resources). It has been
suggested that any determination of futility should be jointly made by the physician, patient, and
surrogate decision maker, with an eye to “strike[] a balance between three criteria: effectiveness,
benefit, and burden,” in achieving the patient’s good. Pellegrino, Decision, supra note 38, at 227.
115. Pellegrino, Decision, supra note 38, at 220, 227. See Amir Halevy, Medical Futility,
Patient Autonomy, and Professional Integrity: Finding the Appropriate Balance, 18 HEALTH
MATRIX 261, 286 (2008) (“[P]rofessional standards and professional integrity must, with
appropriate procedural safeguards, trump the medically inappropriate demands of a patient or
family.”).
116. Defined as a “sense of Christian love.” I OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY 243 (2d ed.
1989).
117. See Pellegrino, Decision, supra note 38, at 241 (advancing charity as an attribute of endof-life care and treatment).
118. Defined as “pity that inclines one to spare or to succor.” III OXFORD ENGLISH
DICTIONARY 597 (2d ed. 1989).
119. Defined as “[t]hat disposition or state of feeling with regard to a person which . . .
manifests itself in solicitude for the welfare of the object . . . .” IX OXFORD ENGLISH
DICTIONARY 52 (2d ed. 1998); see Joseph Fletcher, Love Is the Only Measure, 83
COMMONWEALTH 427, 429 (1966) (“Good is first and foremost the good of people. Christians
call it ‘love,’ meaning neighbor-concern or agape. This love means, of course, a social attitude,
not the romantic emotion that the word has come to connote in popular literature.”).
120. Defined as a “[d]isposition to forgive or show compassion.” IX OXFORD ENGLISH
DICTIONARY 625-26 (2d ed. 1989).
121. POSNER, JUDGES, supra note 44, at 117.
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Elusive though such judgment may be to capture or own, sound, reasoned
judgments in medico-legal decision making must be the norm and not the
exception.
To initiate or continue with medically futile treatment should be
recognized as simply wrong; for, acting in such a manner not only denies the
fact of human finitude but additionally imposes unnecessary effort, expense,
and emotional trauma on both patients and other affected parties. 122 When
efforts to treat futile medical conditions are undertaken, such actions serve as
a total abnegation of one of the cardinal principles of medical ethics—namely
beneficence.123
It has been argued persuasively that while the state may declare a
legitimate interest in morality,124 for it to meet a heightened level of judicial
scrutiny on review of such end-of-life declarations, it faces an increasingly
difficult challenge to justify a decision to sacrifice “claims of associational
autonomy”125—grounded as such “in ‘expressive’ association or in ‘intimate’
association”126—in order to protect public morality. Accordingly, the state
must take care to eschew administrative, judicial, or legislative
determinations that abridge “choices central to personal dignity and
autonomy, [which] are central to the liberty protected by the Fourteenth
Amendment.”127
It is logical to assume that the right to compassionate care in end-stage
illness is, indeed, grounded in a liberty interest and, thus, cannot be unduly
challenged or restricted by a state interest in judging the “morality” of
autonomous actions designed to give purpose and promote the basic interest
in liberty to die with dignity. 128 Society’s central obligation is to refrain from
mandating one moral code over another, and, instead, to define and
safeguard “the liberty of all”129 and promote social policies which address

122. Pellegrino, Decision, supra note 38, at 234 (suggesting that refusing treatment due to
economic concerns “could . . . be an act of charity in the interests of one’s family or to society at
large”).
123. Id. at 223; see PELLEGRINO & THOMASMA, supra note 89, at 29 (discussing several
examples of court cases that emphasized “patient’s wishes . . . as a means for protecting the
patient’s best interests”).
124. Laurence H. Tribe, Lawrence v. Texas: The “Fundamental Right” That Dare Not Speak
Its Name, 117 HARV. L. REV. 1893, 1935-36 (2004).
125. Id. at 1936.
126. Id.
127. Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 851 (1992).
128. See Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 573-74, 578 (2003) (quoting Bowers v. Hardwick,
478 U.S. 186, 216 (1986) (Stevens, J., dissenting)) (explaining that intimate and personal
decisions central to personal dignity and autonomy are central to the liberty protected by the
Fourteenth Amendment).
129. Casey, 505 U.S. at 850. The right of privacy from governmental intrusions, expressed in
Griswold v. Connecticut and Eisenstadt v. Baird, add to the strength of the liberty of
associational expression found in Lawrence, in arguing for a right to die with dignity without
unduly burdensome state interference. See Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 484-86 (1965)
(explaining that various guarantees in the Bill of Rights create “zones of privacy”); Eisenstadt v.
Baird, 405 U.S. 438, 453 (1972) (“If the right of privacy means anything, it is the right of the
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suffering with charity, compassion, and common sense. 130 Intregal to this
societal obligation is recognition of a co-ordinate duty of health care
providers “not to prolong dying.”131 This duty arguably coalesces with and,
indeed, validates the very principle of beneficence, 132 and—accordingly—
shapes a new “right” of the terminally ill not to endure refractory pain and
existential suffering at the end-stage of life,133 and, thus, ensure that death
occurs with some semblance of dignity.134

individual . . . to be free from unwarranted governmental intrusion into matters so
fundamentally affecting a person as the decision whether to bear or beget a child.”).
130. See DAVID C. THOMASMA, HUMAN LIFE IN THE BALANCE 194-95 (1990) (describing
social policies that could support a commitment to control pain and address suffering); see also
du Bois-Pedain, supra note 3, at 297 (arguing that the duty of care “should be understood as
giving rise to a distinct moral, and consequently also to a distinct legal regime”); HERRING,
CARING AND THE LAW, supra note 3, at 88-101 (considering the role of the state in providing
care). See generally Nancy K. Knauer, Aging in the United States: Rethinking Justice, Equality,
and Identity Across the Lifespan, 21 TEMP. POL. & CIV. RTS. L. REV. 305 (2012) (discussing
University of Virginia Professor Lois Shepard’s view that on end-of-life medical care should be
“approached . . . with consideration to patient’s wishes, values, intrerests, and relationships—and
without special laws”).
131. THOMASMA, supra note 130, at 194. This duty should be triggered when one is diagnosed
as terminally ill, has made a determination (or executed an advance directive) that, because of
medical conditions, life no longer has personal meaning, or when, even though no such decision
has been made by the patient and there is no advance directive, there is nonetheless a medical
realization that the terminal illness is “in its imminent phase and the patient is no longer able to
participate in the spiritual and material goods of human life.” Id.
132. See PELLEGRINO & THOMASMA, supra note 89, at 26-27, 32-35 (explaining that
beneficence acts towards the best interests of the patient).
133. See ERIC J. CASSELL, THE NATURE OF SUFFERING AND THE GOALS OF MEDICINE 27376 (2d ed. 2004) (discussing “[t]he progression of suffering” and noting that “the experience of
illness of which the pain in part is fed by external events such as unhappy interactions with
physicians, medical, care, or institutions, the injury to the patients begins to broaden”); see also
Jeffrey T. Berger, Rethinking Guidelines for the Use of Palliative Sedation, HASTINGS CTR.
REP., May/Jun. 2010, at 32, 32-33 (2010) (explaining that palliative sedation can provide relief for
patients at end of life).
134. See EPSTEIN, supra note 18, at 311 (describing “the needless amount of suffering that”
takes place at the end of life without assisted suicide); CHARLES FOSTER, HUMAN DIGNITY IN
BIOETHICS AND LAW 170-72 (2011) (discussing the concerns of dignity in end-of-life scenarios
and various British cases involving such situations); POSNER, AGING AND OLD AGE, supra note
98, at 260 (advocating for a right of physician-assisted suicide for the terminally ill); see also
Henig, supra note 21, at 42 (discussing Professor Margaret Battin’s notion that two essential
moral constructs must be operating in tandem before physician assistance at death should be
allowed: namely, autonomy—with a sincere patient acknowledgment of a wish to die—and
mercy, a medical conclusion that death assistance is the only way in which intractable pain and
suffering can be abated).

